We document empirically that time-variations in investors' expectations about future capital gains can account for up to two thirds of the variation of the S&P500's price dividend (PD) ratio over the postwar period. We then construct an asset pricing model with rational investors that hold subjective price beliefs and update these optimally over time. The model successfully accounts for the behavior of the U.S. PD ratio, as well as for the positive correlation between the PD ratio and survey measures of expected returns. As we show, models that impose objective price beliefs (rational price expectations) cannot simultaneously account for both facts. The model with subjective beliefs predicts that belief updating dynamics can give rise to persistent asset price booms that ultimately result in a price bust. JEL Class. No.: G12, D84
be accounted for by movements in investors' subjective expectations about future capital gains and that these subjective expectations are to a large extent influenced by past stock price behavior. In the asset pricing model we present, sustained stock price booms and busts emerge from subjective belief dynamics that give rise to low-frequency waves of optimism and pessimism about the capital gains from stock investments. These phenomena occur even though all investors behave individually rational, i.e., maximize expected infinite horizon utility and update beliefs optimally using Bayes' law.
While the traditional asset pricing literature can successfully account for large fluctuations in stock prices (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane (1999) or Bansal and Yaron (2004) ) it operates under the assumption of objective price beliefs or rational expectations (RE), which shuts down the subjective belief dynamics emphasized in the present paper. We show in section 2 of the paper that the RE assumption gives rise to a counterfactual prediction for the behavior of agents' subjective beliefs: it implies that investors' return expectations should correlate negatively with the asset price. As we show, in the data this correlation is unambiguously positive. Our asset pricing model is consistent with the observed positive correlation, which makes us confident that at least part of the observed stock price fluctuations are the result of variations in subjective expectations about future stock prices. Indeed, our model can simultaneously replicate the behavior of the price dividend ratio of the S&P 500 over the postwar period, as well as the available evidence on stock price expectations obtained from survey data.
The model we construct is close to a Lucas (1978) asset pricing model with standard time separable preferences but considers investors that possess only limited knowledge about the equilibrium behavior of stock prices. Specifically, we consider investors who hold subjective prior beliefs about the stock price process that differ slightly from the ones assigned to agents under the rational expectations hypothesis. We then show that agents' attempts to improve their knowledge about price behavior can give rise to self-reinforcing asset price dynamics that take the form of low-frequency boom and bust cycles in asset prices.
While investors may hold subjective prior beliefs about stock prices, investors are 'internally rational' in the sense of Adam and Marcet (2011) . Specifically, all investors are perfectly selfish, i.e., make contingent plans to maximize infinite horizon expected utility and optimally update their probability beliefs about payoff relevant variables in a dynamically consistent way. The decision theoretic microfoundations of the model distinguishes it from much of the earlier literature studying learning about price behavior in asset pricing contexts and has the advantage that it can also serve to answer important normative questions, although addressing these is beyond the scope of this paper.
Imperfect information about the price process has strong implications for equilibrium asset price behavior because optimality then dictates that agents use past prices to learn about the stochastic process governing price behavior. Such learning from past price observations tends to generate important feedback effects and can give rise to momentum in asset price behavior. Suppose, for example, that agents become more optimistic (pessimistic) about the future capital gains whenever they are positively (negatively) surprised by past capital gains, in line with the evidence provided in Malmendier and Nagel (2011) who show that experienced returns affect beliefs about future asset returns. The positive (negative) surprise increases (decreases) asset prices further whenever increased optimism (pessimism) leads to an increase (decrease) in investors' asset demand. If this effect is sufficiently strong, then positive (negative) surprises may even trigger further positive (negative) surprises and thus further price increases (decreases). As we show analytically, stock prices do increase with capital gain optimism whenever the substitution effect of increased optimism dominates the wealth effect. When this is the case, asset prices changes tend to display low frequency momentum, which gives rise to sustained price increases and decreases, similar to what can be observed in the data.
After a sequence of sustained changes countervailing forces come into play that dampen the price momentum, eventually halt it and lead to a reversal. Consider, for example, a situation where increased capital gain optimism has given rise to a stock price boom. Stock prices then make up for a larger part of total wealth because stock prices are high, but also because agents discount other forms of income, say future wage income, at a higher rate. As we show, this eventually causes the wealth effect to dominate the substitution effect, whenever the coefficient of relative risk aversion is larger than one, so that increases in optimism at some point cease to lead to further increases in asset prices. Once price increases come to a halt, investors' capital gains expectations turn out to be too optimistic relative to the realized outcomes. This leas to a downward revision in beliefs, which gives rise to negative price momentum and results in a reversal of the asset price.
We show that our simple learning model is able to replicate the low frequency behavior of the price dividend ratio of the S&P 500 over the postwar period and is consistent with survey evidence on return expectations collected from a representative sample of U.S. investors that is available over the tech stock boom and bust period between 1998 and 2006. Specifically, the learning model is consistent with the fact that investors' expectations correlate positively with the price dividend ratio over this period, i.e., that investors' return expectations were highest at the peak of the tech boom in the early part of the year 2000. As mentioned before, asset pricing model that impose rational price expectations cannot replicate this fact.
In related work Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2012) formally estimate a simpler asset pricing model with learning and show that it can quantitatively replicate the behavior of important stock price moments that would otherwise appear puzzling when assuming standard time separable preferences. To be able to formally estimate the model, they assume an exogenous stochastic discount factor. As a result of this simplification, the model implies that return expectations are independent of asset prices, so that it fails to replicate the positive correlation between expected returns and stock prices observed in the data.
1 In addition, the simplification implies that price booms would often not come to an end, which required imposing an exogenous upper bound on agents' beliefs (a socalled projection facility). 2 While the ability to match stock price moments turns out to be very robust to the precise value chosen for the upper bound, such a model is clearly not suited to address the issue of asset price booms and busts. The present paper considers a model with an endogenous discount factor, where stock holding plans and consumption plans are determined endogenously, so that booms endogenously come to a halt due to the wealth effects described above. Solving such a model, however, is technically more demanding as it requires solving for agents' optimal state contingent consumption and stockholding plans. This involves solving a non-linear optimization problem in which agents' posterior beliefs and stock holdings are state variables. Despite these features, we are able to derive a closed form solution for the equilibrium asset price under learning in the limiting case of vanishing uncertainty about future variables, which allows us to illustrate most of our findings analytically. When seeking to match the behavior of the U.S. PD ratio the paper relies on numerical solutions of the nonlinear asset pricing model that incorporate uncertainty.
Models of learning have been used before to explain various aspects of asset price behavior. Timmermann (1993 Timmermann ( , 1996 , for example, considers Bayesian learning about the dividend process and sets the asset price equal to the discounted expected sum of dividends. He finds that learning about dividends can increase asset price volatility, but that the quantitative effect is limited. Importantly, learning about dividends does not give rise to feedback effects, as agents' beliefs about the dividend process influence market prices, but agents' beliefs remain unaffected by market prices. This confirms Shiller's (1981) classic finding that volatility of dividend expectations alone cannot generate sufficient asset price volatility. Work by Bullard and Duffy (2001) and Brock and Hommes (1998) explore learning about price forecasting and show that learning dynamics can converge to complicated attractors that increase asset return volatility, if the RE equilibrium is unstable under learning dynamics. 3 Branch and Evans (2010) study a model where agents' algorithm to form expectations switches depending on which of the available forecast models is performing best. and show that this can give rise to switches in volatility regimes. Cárceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007) assume that agents know the mean stock price and learn about how prices deviate from the mean following fundamental shocks; they find that the presence of learning does then not significantly alter the behavior of asset prices. 4 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section documents that there is a strong and positive correlation between the PD ratio and survey measures of investors' return expectations. It also shows why models a negative correlation.
with rational price expectations imply a negative correlation instead. It then documents that up to two thirds of the variation in the PD ratio can potentially be accounted for by variations in expected capital gains, if these are updated according to some simple adaptive prediction model. Section 3 introduces our asset pricing model with subjective beliefs. For benchmark purposes, section 4 determines the RE equilibrium of the model. In section 5 we relax agents' prior beliefs about price behavior and derive the resulting Bayesian updating equations characterizing belief dynamics. After imposing market clearing in section 6, we present closed form solutions for the equilibrium price dividend ratio in section 7 for the special case with vanishing uncertainty. This section also explains how belief updating dynamics can endogenously give rise to boom and bust dynamics in asset prices. Section 8 documents the model's ability to replicate the behavior of the postwar US price dividend ratio and the survey data on stock price expectations. A conclusion briefly summarizes. Technical material and proofs can be found in the appendix.
Stock Prices and Stock Price Expectations: Some Facts
This section explains how two important and widely accepted asset pricing facts imply that investors' expectations about future stock returns correlate negatively with the price dividend (PD) if one assumes that investors' hold rational expectations (RE) about future stock prices. Survey measures of investors' return expectations correlate instead positively with the PD ratio; this positive correlation is statistically significant and robust to considering different survey measures and data sources. A simple adaptive prediction assumption quantitatively captures the behavior of survey expectations and can potentially also account for a large share of the variation of the U.S. PD ratio in postwar data. A first well-known fact is that stock prices experience substantial price booms and price busts. Figure 1 illustrates this behavior for the post-WWII period for the United States, using the quarterly price dividend ratio (PD ratio) of the S&P 500 index. 5 The quarterly PD ratio fluctuates widely and in a persistent manner, reaching values below 60 in 1951 and values above 350 in the year 2000. Throughout this period, the PD ratio displays persistent run-ups and reversals, with the largest one occurring around the year 2000. This behavior implies that price growth can persistently outstrip dividend growth over a number of periods, and that the situation reverses eventually. In fact, the PD ratio has a tendency to slowly mean revert over time (the quarterly autocorrelation of the PD ratio is 0.98). Similar run-ups and reversals can be documented for other mature stock markets, e.g., for the European or Japanese markets. A second well-accepted fact is that the growth rate of dividends is largely unpredictable, e.g., Campbell (2003) , and is especially hard to predict using the PD ratio. The  2 of an in-sample predictive regression of cumulative dividend growth 1, 5 or 10 years ahead on the PD ratio are tiny and amount to 0.03, 0.04, and 0.07, respectively, for the U.S. post-war data.
The unpredictability of dividend growth and the large and ultimately meanreverting swings in the PD ratio are important features of the data that virtually all asset pricing theories seek to replicate. Taken together, these two facts imply that the PD ratio negatively predicts future stock market returns. To see this, let the asset return  +1 be defined as
where  denotes the stock price and  dividends. Given a high (low) value of the PD ratio in , we have -due to the mean reverting behavior of the PD ratio -that on average
follows that a high PD ratio negatively predicts future returns. Campbell (2003) documents this fact empirically for a large number of countries, including the U.S. The previous observations are of interest because they imply that any rational expectations asset pricing theory that is consistent with the PD ratio displaying large and mean reverting swings and dividend growth being unpredictable, will also predict that agents expectations about future stock market returns covary negatively with the PD ratio. 6 This is simply due to the fact that the RE hypothesis implies that agents catch on to any systematic pattern that can be exploited to predict future returns. Somewhat counterintuitively, the previous conclusion implies that at the height of the tech stock boom in the year 2000, where the PD ratio in figure 1 reaches its peak, investors have had particularly low expectations about future stock returns.
Survey evidence on investors' return expectations shows instead that there exists a strong positive correlation between investors' expected returns and the PD ratio. Figure 2 depicts this for our preferred survey, the UBS Gallup Survey, which is based on a representative sample of approximately 1.000 U.S. investors that own at least 10.000 US$ in financial wealth. The figure shows the US PD ratio (the black line) together with two measures of the cross-sectional average of investors' one year ahead expected real returns.
7 These expectations measures are investors' expectations about the one year ahead stock market return, as well as their expectations about the one year ahead returns from their own stock portfolio. The two expectations measures behave very similarly, but the latter is available for a longer time period, which is why we focus on it as a baseline case. As can be seen from figure 2, there is a strong positive correlation between the PD ratio and expected returns, e.g., the correlation between the expected portfolio returns and the PD ratio is +0.70 and even higher for the expected stock returns (+0.82). Moreover, investors' expectations were highest at the beginning of the year 2000, which is precisely the year the PD ratio reached its peak during the tech stock boom. Investors then expected annualized real returns of close to 14% from stock investments. Conversely, investors were most pessimistic in the year 2003 when the PD ratio also reached a bottom, expecting then annual real returns of just around 4%. Table 2 shows that the strong positive correlation evident from figure 2 is robust to a number of alternative approaches for extracting expectations the survey, such as using the median instead of the mean expectation, when using inflation expectations from the Michigan survey to obtain real return expectations, when using plain nominal returns instead of real returns, or when considering only investors with more than 100.000 US$ in financial wealth. The numbers reported in brackets in table 2 are the p-values for the correlation being equal to zero, which shows that all correlations are significantly positive at the 1% level.
Nominal
Real A positive and statistically significant correlation between the PD ration and return expectations is equally obtained when considering other survey data. Table 3 reports the correlations when using return expectations from Bob Shiller's Individual Investors' Survey. While the individuals included in the survey are not a representative sample of U.S. investors, an advantage of this survey is that is provides return expectations over different prediction horizons. Again, all correlations are strongly positive and significant at the 1% level but correlations do seem to increase for longer prediction horizons. Table 4 reports the correlations for the stock return expectations reported in the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) survey which surveys chief financial officers from large U.S. corporations. Again one finds a strong positive correlation that is significant at the 1% level in all cases. The survey evidence suggests that agents become optimistic about future capital gains whenever they have observed prices going up in the past, and similarly that they become more pessimistic about future capital gains after prices have been declining. Such behavior would also be consistent with the time series evidence presented in figure 2 where the peaks and throughs of the PD ratio are located very closely to the peaks and throughs of investors' return expectations. To evaluate the promise of such an 'adaptive' approach to forecasting stock prices, let us suppose for a moment that agents subjective conditional expectations about price growth e   [ +1   ] evolves according to the following adaptive prediction model
where   0 indicates how strongly price growth expectations are updated in the direction of the forecast error. While equation (1) (1) can be use to feed in historical price growth data, allowing us to compare the resulting price growth expectations to those implied by the UBS survey. 8 Figure 3 reports the outcome of this procedure, when assuming initial beliefs in Q1:1946 to be equal to −112% per quarter and  = 0024343, which minimizes the sum of squared deviations from the survey evidence. Figure 3 reports growth expectations in terms of quarterly real growth rates and shows that the adaptive model captures the behavior of UBS price growth expectations extremely well: the correlation between the two series is equal to 0.89.
What is truly surprising, however, is the fact that the price growth expectations implied by equation (1) seem capable of 'explaining' a large part of the variation in the PD ratio over the entire post-war period. This can be seen in figure 4, which plots the U.S. PD ratio (y-axis) against the price growth expectations implied by the adaptive prediction model (x-axis) for the entire post war sample. The historical PD ratios line up positively with the adaptive price growth expectations: when regressing the PD ratio on a constant and the expectations of the adaptive prediction model, one obtains an  2 of 0.55; using also the square of the adaptive prediction, the  2 rises further to 0.67, which suggests that up two-thirds of the variation in the post war U.S. PD ratio may be attributable to variations in investor's subjective capital gains expectations. 8 We transform survey measures of return expectations into a measure of price growth expectations using the identity
where   denotes the expected quarterly growth rate of dividends that we set equal to the sample average of dividend growth over Q1:1946-Q1:2012, i.e,   = 10048. Results regarding implied price growth are very robust towards changing   to alternative empricially plausible values. (1) Furthermore, when separating out the data points after the year 2000, this relationship becomes even stronger: as figure 4 indicates, the relationship between the PD ratio and the adaptive predictions seems to have shifted persistently upward after the year 2000.
9 Clearly, this was also a period in which interest rates were well below their historical values, with nominal rates reaching zero for a prolonged period of time.
The previous findings suggest that an asset pricing model consistent with equation (1) that predicts a positive relationship between the PD ratio and subjective expectations about future price growth, of the kind implied by figure 4, has a good chance of replicating a large share of the variation of the historical PD ratio, as well as the observed positive comovement between price growth expectations and the PD ratio. The next sections spell out such the microfoundations of such a model.
A Simple Asset Pricing Model
Consider an endowment economy populated by a unit mass of infinitely lived agents  ∈ [0 1] trading one unit of a stock in a competitive stock market. Agents earn each period an exogenous wage income    0 and stocks deliver the dividend    0. Dividend and wage incomes come in the form of perishable consumption goods.
where   denotes consumption,   0 the coefficient of relative risk aversion,   the agent's stockholdings, chosen from some compact, non-empty and convex set S,  ≥ 0 the (ex-dividend) price of the stock,  ≥ 0 an exogenous dividend,  ≥ 0 the exogenous wage income, and P  the agent's subjective probability measure, which may or may not satisfy the rational expectations hypothesis. Details of P  will be specified below.
Dividend and Wage Income. As standard in the literature, we assume that dividends grow at a constant rate and that dividend growth innovations are unpredictable, i.e.,
We also specify an exogenous wage income process, so that the resulting equilibrium consumption process   =   +   is empirically plausible. First, in line with Campbell and Cochrane (1999) , we set the standard deviation of consumption growth to be 1/7 of the standard deviation of dividend growth. Second, again following these authors, we set the correlation between consumption and dividend growth equal to 0.2. Third, we choose a wage process such that the average dividend consumption ratio in the model ( [    ]) equals the average ratio of personal consumption expenditure to net dividend income in the U.S. data. All this can be parsimoniously achieved using the following wage income process
Given the variance of dividend growth  2  , which is easily estimated from the data, one can use   and  2  to impose the desired volatility of consumption growth and the desired correlation with dividend growth. Furthermore, one can then choose  to obtain the targeted average for the dividend-consumption ratio, so that all parameters of the wage income process are determined. Appendix B explains the details of how this is achieved and that this results in a situation where
Since dividend income finances only a small share of consumption, targeting the average dividend-consumption ratio yields  = 22, so that the standard deviation of wage growth is approximately equal to that of dividend growth, although the two are negatively correlated, so as to achieve a low volatility for consumption growth.
The Underlying Probability Space. Agents hold a potentially lessthan-fully-rational set of probability beliefs about all variables that are beyond their control. In the present setup these variables consist of dividends, wage income and competitive stock market prices. Let Ω denote the space of possible realizations for infinite sequences of these variables. A typical element  ∈ Ω is then given by
 denotes the set of all (nonnegative) price, dividend and wage histories from period zero up to period  and   its typical element. The agent's plans will be contingent on the history   , i.e., the agent chooses
The underlying probability space is then given by (Ω B,P  ) with B denoting the corresponding -Algebra of Borel subsets of Ω, and P  a probability measure over (Ω B).
Although there is a time-invariant probability measure P  , the previous setup allows accommodating agents that are learning about the stochastic processes governing the evolution of prices, dividends, and wages. For example, P  may arise from a view about how these variables evolve over time, plus some prior beliefs about unknown parameters entering the evolution equations. The beliefs about the unknown parameters are then updated following newly observed prices, dividends and wages. A particular example of this kind will be given in section 5 when we discuss learning about stock price behavior.
The probability space defined above is slightly more general than that typically specified in a rational expectations model, where Ω comprises only the variables that are treated as exogenous in the model (  and   ). Under the RE hypothesis, agents know the equilibrium price   associated with any given history of dividends and wages, so that prices carry only redundant information and can be excluded from the probability space without loss of generality. We entertain a more general formulation here because because we want to allow for a situation where agents do not know exactly which price materializes given a particular history of dividends and wages. Much akin to academic economists, investors in our model have not converged on a single asset pricing model that associates a single market price with any given history of exogenous fundamentals.
Existence of Optimal Plans. The choice set is compact and non-empty. A slight complication for insuring existence of optimal plans is that for  ≥ 1 ( ≤ 1) utility fails to be bounded from below (above), so that the objective function is not necessarily continuous. To deal with this issue, we impose some mild conditions insuring existence. We thereby focus on the case   1, which is the parameterization used in our empirical application, but corresponding conditions can be imposed when ≤ 1.
Condition 1: Assume   1 and for all  ∈ [0 1]
Condition (6) simply imposes that agents' subjective beliefs assign probability zero to future dividends being negative. Condition (7) requires that agents' subjective expectations of the discounted sum of wages are not 'too pessimistic'. Both assumptions together insure that the maximized value of problem (2) is finite, i.e., bounded from below, as just consuming the wage income already insures that utility is finite.
10 This allows us to abstract from policies yielding unboundedly negative utility, so that an optimal plan is insured to exist.
11
If agents hold rational wage and dividend expectations, i.e., know (4), then Condition 1 holds whenever
where
see appendix D for details. Condition (8) is also a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a RE equilibrium with finite utility.
Sufficiency of First Order Conditions. Substituting the constraint (3) into the objective function (2) delivers
Given condition 1, the objective (10) is strictly concave. Since the choice set is assumed convex in    , first order conditions are necessary and sufficient for 10 More precisely, since   = 1 for all  ≥ 0 is a feasible stockholding policy and because (6) insures   ≥ 0, the expected utility of this stockholding policy, which implies to consume wage and dividend income, must be above the finite utility value defined on the l.h.s. of (7), which is the utility from consuming wage income only.
11 Technically, one can define the following continuous objective function
which replaces (2), without altering the optimal policy.
optimality and the optimal stockholding policy is unique, allowing us to work with the first order conditions (FOCs). Assuming an interior solution, the FOC is given by
which has to hold for all  ≥ 0. Evaluating the FOC requires agents to formulate beliefs about future dividend growth ( +1   ), future capital gains ( +1   ) and the ratio of future wage to non-wage income ( +1  +1 ). Agents' current economic situation is thereby described by the stocks owned from the previous period (  −1 ), the price dividend ratio (    ) at which they can trade the stock, the current ratio of wage to non-wage income (    ), and by their conditional beliefs P  |  . The solution to FOC (11) is a stock demand function of the form
that specifies the optimal assets demand as a function of the agent's current economic situation, summarized by the variables
, and the agent's beliefs, which can be a function of the entire history   .
Rational Expectations (RE) Equilibrium
Assuming that agents know how dividends and wages evolve, i.e., know equation (4), and hold rational price expectations, appendix C derives the following result:
Proposition 1 Suppose condition 1 holds, agents know (4) and hold rational price expectations. If price expectations satisfy the usual transversality condition (stated explicitly in appendix C), the RE equilibrium price is given by
With RE the PD ratio is an iid process, which is the simplest form of a mean reverting process. As discussed before, mean reversion in the PD ratio coupled with unpredictable dividend growth and rational expectations implies that the PD ratio covaries negatively with expected returns, unlike suggested by the survey data. To see this note that (13) implies
, so that one-step-ahead price growth expectations covary negatively with the current price dividend ratio.
12 Since the dividend component of returns also covaries negatively with current price, the same holds true for expected returns.
In the interest of deriving analytical solutions, we shall consider below the limiting case with vanishing uncertainty ( 2    2  → 0). For further reference we note here that the RE solution then simplifies to the perfect foresight outcome:
which is characterized by prices and dividend growing at the constant rate   and therefore a constant PD ratio.
Learning about Capital Gains
We now relax the RE hypothesis and endow agents with a more general model of the asset price process. Consistent with the empirical behavior of the price dividend ratio documented in section 2, we allow for beliefs that the growth rate of prices exceeds the growth rate of dividends, as is the case in an asset price boom, or that it falls short of the dividend growth rate, as occurs in a price bust. To emphasize the importance of learning about price behavior rather than learning about the behavior of dividends or the wage income process, which was the focus of much of the earlier literature on learning in asset markets, e.g., Timmermann (1993 Timmermann ( , 1996 , we continue to assume that agents know the processes (4), i.e., hold rational dividend and wage income expectations.
13
It is important to note that knowledge of the true process for dividends and wages while holding at the same time subjective beliefs about future prices is entirely consistent with optimal behavior on the part of investors. In particular, it is generally not possible to derive price beliefs from the agent's dividend and wage beliefs using optimal behavior on the part of the agent, i.e., the (necessary and sufficient) FOC (11). Only in the special case with risk neutral agents ( = 0), one obtains from forward-iteration on (11) a present value relationship of the form
which is independent of the agents' own choices. Assuming a standard transver-
The PD ratio under RE is proportional to 1 +    , see equation (13), while   depends inversely on 1 +    . 13 The assumption that agents know (4) implies that agents' beliefs satsify Condition 1 whenever    1, i.e., under the same conditions guaranteeing the existence of a RE equilibrium with finite utility.
an expression for the equilibrium price as a function of dividend beliefs only. 14 Yet, for the general case with   0, future stockholding choices cannot be eliminated from the present value formulation. The FOCs are then insufficient to determine price beliefs and stockholding policies at the same time, thereby providing an independent role for price beliefs for determining the agent's choices and equilibrium prices.
Generalized Price Beliefs. Price growth in the RE equilibrium features a constant mean and an unpredictable noise component, see equation (14). In contrast, price growth in the data displays persistent time-varying components that lead to sustained increases and sustained decreases in asset prices, as discussed in section 2. We wish to allow for subjective beliefs that are consistent with these features. Specifically, we assume that agents' perceive prices to evolve according to the process
where  +1 denotes a transitory shock to price growth and  +1 a persistent price growth component that is assumed to drift slowly over time according to
and that can capture periods with sustained asset price increases (
. 15 In the limiting case where the variance of the innovation ln  +1 becomes small, the persistent price growth component behaves almost like a constant, as is the case in the RE solution.
For simplicity, we assume that agents perceive the innovations ln  +1 and ln  +1 to be jointly normally distributed according to
Since agents observe the change of the asset price, but do not separately observe the persistent and transitory elements driving it, the previous setup defines a filtering problem in which agents need to decompose observed price growth into the persistent and transitory subcomponents, so as to forecast optimally. The next paragraph describes the solution to the optimal filtering problem.
Learning about the Capital Gains Process. To obtain a parsimonious description of beliefs we specify conjugate prior beliefs in which agent 's initial 14 See Adam and Marcet (2011) for a discussion of how this result breaks down in the presence of trading constraints. 15 We deliberately do not incorporate any mean-reversion into price growth beliefs as we seek to determine model-endogenous forces that lead to a reversal of asset price booms and busts, rather than having these features emerge because they are hard-wired into beliefs. As discussed below, return expectations nevertheless incorporate some degree of mean reversion.
beliefs about the unobserved persistent component ln  0 is distributed according to
where the prior beliefs are assumed independent of all other random variables at all times. Equations (18)- (21) together with knowledge of the dividend and wage income processes (4) then jointly specify agents' probability beliefs P  .
Setting prior uncertainty ¡   0 ¢ 2 equal to its steady state value  2 , given by
the optimal Bayesian filter implies that the posterior beliefs following some history   are (see theorem 3.1 in West and Harrison (1997) ):
with
Agents' beliefs can thus be parsimoniously summarized by a single state variable (ln    ) describing agents' degree of optimism about future capital gains. These beliefs about capital gains evolve recursively according to equation (24) and imply that
which is -up to the presence of logs and variance correction terms emerging due the concavity of the log function -identical to the adaptive prediction model considered in section specification 2.
How this nest RE price beliefs. The belief specification (4) and (18)-(21) nests RE beliefs in when entering the prior mean at its RE value, i.e.,
and when considering the limiting case with vanishing uncertainty, where
Agents' prior beliefs at  = 0 about price growth in  ≥ 1 then increasingly concentrates at the perfect foresight outcome ln   , see equations (22)- (24), i.e., approaches in distribution the perfect foresight outcome (16). With price and dividend expectations being rational this implies that the perfect foresight RE solution   0 =   (1 −   ) is indeed an equilibrium outcome at  = 0 in the limit. Importantly, it is possible to continue studying learning dynamics with vanishing risk: keeping the limiting ratio  2   2  finite and bounded from zero as uncertainty vanishes, the Kalman gain parameter , as defined in (25), remains well-specified in the limit and satisfies lim
Implied return expectations. Although price growth expectations are persistent for the subjective beliefs specified above, expected return implied by these beliefs will depend -ceteris paribus -negatively on the PD ratio. This can be seen using (26) to obtain an expression for expected future returns
(27) Intuitively, for given beliefs    about future capital gains, a higher higher PD ratio today implies lower returns in the future because a high value for the PD ratio lowers the expected yield from future dividend payments, as captured by the second term in (27). Return expectations may nevertheless covary positively with the PD ratio in equilibrium, because this dividend yield component is generally small (especially during an asset price boom where     is small), so that the direct effects of higher price growth expectations, as captured by the first term in (27) dominate the dividend yield effect and thereby the fluctuations in expected returns. We shall verify whether this is the case in our empirical application.
Dynamics under Learning
We now show how equilibrium prices are determined under the subjective beliefs introduced in the previous section. With agents' beliefs being summarized by their conditional expectations of future capital gains (ln    ), the asset demand function (12) takes the considerably simpler form
As a benchmark, we will now assume that all agents hold identical beliefs (ln    = ln   for all ). While agents may initially hold heterogenous prior beliefs, heterogeneity vanishes asymptotically, as they all observe the same data. The asset dynamics derived under the assumption of identical beliefs thus describe the long-run outcomes of model. 18 Imposing market clearing in periods  and  − 1 then delivers that the equilibrium price in any period  ≥ 0 solves
The beliefs ln   and the price dividend ratio     are now simultaneously determined via equations (24) and (29). Unfortunately, this simultaneity can give rise to multiple market clearing price and belief pairs, due to a complementarity between realized capital gains and expected future capital gains. Intuitively, a higher PD ratio implies higher realized capital gains and thus higher expectations of future gains via equation (24). Higher expected future gains may in turn induce a higher willingness to pay for the asset, thereby justifying the higher initial PD ratio. While this multiplicity may be a potentially interesting avenue to explain asset price booms and busts, it prevents us from simulating the model dynamics over time, as it would require selecting among multiple equilibria.
Appendix E shows that the simultaneity can be overcome by slightly modifying the information structure. The modification is relatively straightforward and consists of assuming that agents observe at any time  information about the lagged temporary price growth component  −1 entering equation (18). Appendix E then shows that Bayesian updating implies that
where updating now occurs using only lagged price growth (even though agents do observe current prices) and where ln 
is a time  innovation to agent's information set (unpredictable using information information available to agents up to period  − 1), which reflects the information about the transitory price growth component  −1 received in period  − 1.
With this modification, agents' beliefs ln   are now pre-determined at time , so that the economy evolves according to a uniquely determined recursive process: equation (29) 
Equilibrium Price Dynamics: Analytic Results
We now derive a closed form solution for the equilibrium asset price in the special case where the subjective beliefs P imply no (or vanishing) uncertainty about future prices, dividends and wages.
19 While such beliefs are unrealistic from an empirical standpoint, this simplification allows deriving important insights into how the equilibrium price depends on agents' beliefs, as well as how prices and belief evolve over time. The empirically more relevant case with uncertainty stock markets are intermediated via anonymous electronic exchanges, it appears reasonable to assume that other agents' beliefs, preferences and endowments are not common knowledge among investors. See Adam and Marcet (2011) for a detailed discussion of these points. 19 The absence of uncertainty allows evaluating the nonlinear functions of future values of these variables showing up in the FOCs more easily.
will be considered in section 8 using numerical model solutions of our nonlinear asset pricing model. While quantitative results do depend on the presence of uncertainty, the qualitative relationship between equilibrium prices and agents' subjective beliefs remains unaffected.
The main result is summarized in the proposition below, which express the solution in term of expectations of future returns  + ≡ ( + +  + )  +−1 . The proof of the proposition can be found in appendix F.
Proposition 2 Suppose condition 1 holds, agents' beliefs P imply no uncertainty about future prices, dividends and wages, and
then the equilibrium price in period  is given by
Conditions (31) insure that the infinite sums in the pricing equation (32) converge. They are satisfied, for example, for the expectations associated with the perfect foresight solution, for which (32) implies that the PD ratio equals the perfect foresight PD ratio (17). The belief conditions of the proposition are equally satisfied for the subjective beliefs defined in section 5, when considering the case with vanishing uncertainty (
As these beliefs assume rational wage and dividend expectations, equation (32) simplifies further to
(33) For   1 the first term on the right of equation (33) is decreasing in the expected asset returns, while the second term increases with expected returns. Therefore, in the special case where dividends are the only source of income ( = 0), the equilibrium PD ratio would depend negatively on expected returns, even with subjective return beliefs. For  = 0, the model thus fails to generate the positive correlation between the PD ratio and expected returns documented in the data.asset demand and therefore the asset price decreases as return expectations increase. For   0 the negative wealth effect of increased return expectations becomes even stronger, as higher return expectations now also reduce the present value of wage income. This explains why the first term on the right of equation (33) gets then premultiplied by the factor 1 + , where  denotes the average wage-dividend ratio. Yet, for   0 a second positive price effect emerges, as captured by the second term on the right of (33): as dividend income becomes a smaller share of total income, a substitution effect emerges, which increases stock demand. This can be seen by considering the limiting case  → 1. The first term on the right of equation (33) then becomes independent of return expectations (the substitution and wealth effects associated with changes in expected returns cancel for the case with log utility), but the second term now gives rise to a positive relationship between prices and return expectations, similar to what can be found in the data. Similarly, for   0 and the limiting case with  → ∞ one obtains
Since    1, the second term depends positively on expected returns and gives rise to a positive relationship between prices and expected asset returns, whenever  is sufficiently large. The two limiting results suggest that for sufficiently large  the model with subjective beliefs can generate a positive relationship between return expectations and the PD ratio, as documented for the data.
While the previous discussion is framed in terms of expected returns, the subjective beliefs in section 5 have been specified in terms of price growth and dividend expectations. And as equation (27) shows, the return expectations implied by these beliefs also depend on the PD ratio, so that the pricing equation (33) determines the relationship between the equilibrium PD ratio and the belief state   only implicitly. Figure 5 depicts the PD ratio when solving equation (33) as a function of agents' subjective price growth expectations   , using the parameterization employed in our quantitative section 8, when abstracting from future uncertainty. For price growth beliefs in the neighborhood of the RE value (  ≈   ), the PD ratio is increasing in investors' expected capital gains. The substitution effect dominates the wealth effect in this area because our calibration implies that dividend income finances only a small share of total consumption, namely approximately 4.3%. Therefore, at the perfect foresight beliefs (  =   ) stock market wealth is only a small share of the total present value of household wealth (the same 4.3%). For higher capital gains expectations (     ), stock market wealth increases up to 4.5 times the value assumed in the perfect foresight solution, see figure 5 . At the same time, the present value of wage income is declining, as increased price growth optimism implies higher expected returns (as we show below) and therefore a lower discount factor. The latter can be seen by noting that the FOC (11) can alternatively be written as
21 With increased optimism, stock market wealth thus makes up a substantially larger share of total wealth, which has the same effect as a decrease in . As has been argued before, for sufficiently small values of  the income effect starts to dominate the substitution effect, so that prices start to react negatively to increased optimism. This explains why beyond some degree of optimism the equilibrium price starts to decline as optimism increases. Figure 6 depicts how expected returns at various horizons depend on agent's expected price growth expectations. 22 It shows that expected returns covary generally positively with capital gains expectations, as has been assumed above. Only when price growth expectations are fairly negative, the expected returns far out in the future start to increase, as expected capital gains fall. This is so because for falling prices, the expected dividend yield will eventually result in high return expectations. This fact also explains why the equilibrium prices in figure 5 are less sensitive to a fall in capital gain expectations relative to the perfect foresight value, compared to an increase above this value. Note also that to the right of the perfect foresight value, the relationship between capital gains and expected returns in figure 6 becomes flatter at some point. This is Figure 6 : Expected returns as a function of expected price growth the area in which the PD ratio strongly reacts to price growth expectations in see figure 5 , so that the second term in (27) decreases more strongly in this area than elsewhere. As a result, return expectations are then less sensitive to movements in expected capital gains. Overall, the model predicts mostly a positive relationship between expected capital gains and expected returns, which gives it a good chance to match the positive relationship between the PD ratio and expected stock returns. Figure 7 illustrates how the interplay between price outcomes and belief updating can endogenously generate a sustained asset price boom along which expected returns rise, and that results in a price bust, along which expected returns fall. Consider for example, the situation where agents start with price growth beliefs slightly to the right of the perfect foresight value and that for some exogenous reason agents have revised their price beliefs upwards relative to the previous period. 23 To the right of the perfect foresight solution equilibrium prices increase as a result of this increased initial optimism. Moreover, due to the steep slope of the PD function, see figure 7, realized price growth will strongly exceed the initial increase in price growth. The realized price increase therefore fuels further upward revisions in price growth beliefs via the belief updating equation (30), leading to a series of sustained price increase, i.e., an asset price boom. Along the boom, capital gain and return expectations move upward. The boom comes to an end, when the PD function in figure 7 starts to flatten out as the wealth effect starts to dominate the substitution effect. At this point agents have very optimistic expectations about future capital gains, but these capital gains cease to materialize. This leads to a reversal of the whole process, i.e., a price bust along which falling price growth expectations 
Endogenous Asset Price Boom and Bust Dynamics

Matching the PD Ratio and Survey Evidence
We now consider the asset pricing model with uncertainty and show that it successfully replicates the low frequency behavior of the postwar U.S. PD ratio, as well as the behavior of the survey expectations discussed in section 2.
We calibrate the model as reported in table 5, which also lists the calibration targets. The dividend and wage income processes are calibrated to replicate important features of the US. dividend and consumption process. 24 The perceived uncertainty in stock price growth is set equal to the empirical standard deviation of stock price growth. 25 For the belief updating parameter  and the initial price growth belief  1:1946 we use the values employed in constructing figure 3, which allow matching the UBS survey expectations. This leaves us with two remaining parameters: the time discount factor  and the risk aversion parameter . Since solving the non-linear asset pricing model with subjective beliefs is computationally too costly to be able to run a formal matching or estimation procedure, we simply set risk aversion  = 2 and then experimented with different values for the quarterly discount factor, so as to obtain a good match between the model-implied and the empirical PD ratio for the postwar period. It turns out that  = 0995 achieves a good fit. 
10048
average quarterly real dividend growth   00192 std. deviation quarterly real dividend growth
std. deviation of quarterly real stock price growth Table 5 : Model calibration Figure 8 depicts the equilibrium PD ratio obtained from numerically solving the asset pricing model with uncertainty.
26 Not surprisingly, the presence of price, dividend, and consumption risk lowers the equilibrium PD ratio compared to a setting without risk. The relationship between the PD ratio and price Quarterly PD ratio Model implied PD ratio PD ratio U.S. Data (S&P 500) Figure 11 : PD ratio, model versus data growth expectations is, however, qualitatively unchanged relative to a setting that abstracts from uncertainty. Figure 9 compares the model-implied relationship between the equilibrium PD ratio and subjective beliefs with that implied when fitting a 3rd order polynomial to the data based relationship shown in figure 4, which has been obtained under the assumption that agents use the adaptive prediction model to form beliefs. 27 The figure shows that our asset pricing model captures this relationship extremely well.
This finding is corroborated further when evaluating the ability of the model to replicate the postwar time series of the PD ratio. We do so by first feeding the historical price growth data into our model-based belief updating equation (30) to obtain a model implied value for expected price growth. 28 The resulting series is shown in figure 10 . Not surprisingly, it predicts a strong rise and fall of price growth expectations around the year 2000. In a second step we use the model-implied equilibrium PD function, shown in figure 9 , to derive a model implied time series for the PD ratio associated with the model implied beliefs. In a final step, we compare the model implied PD series with that in the data. Figure 11 depicts the predicted and actual PD series. It shows that the model captures a lot of the low-frequency variation in the historically observed PD ratio. In particular, it captures the strong run-up in the PD ratio up to the year 2000, as well as its decline up until the year 2002. After 2003, however, the model predicts a much lower PD ratio than is observed in the data. Figure 12 shows that the discrepancy after the year 2003 can at least partly 27 The figure shows the fitted relationship over the range of values for the PD ratio observed in the data sample. 28 We thereby shut down all other sources of information about price growth, i.e., set ln  1  = 0 for all  in equation (30). Overall, the deterioration in the match of the PD ratio after the year 2003 is hardly surprising, given the empirical evidence shown in 4, which already suggested that the PD relationship in the data has shifted upward towards the end of the sample period. While we can only speculate about potential reasons causing this shift, the exceptionally low real interest rates implemented by the Federal Reserve System following the reversal of the tech stock boom and the collapse of the subsequent housing boom may partly contribute to the observed discrepancy. Formally incorporating the effects of monetary policy decisions into the present model would thus appear to be of interest, but is well beyond the scope of the present paper.
Conclusions
We constructed a model with subjective price beliefs and show how this models suggests that a large fraction of the observed price fluctuations in the post war PD ratio of the S&P 500 can be accounted for by variations in investors' expectations about future capital gains. The model gives rise to endogenous stock price boom and bust dynamics, along which capital gains expectations first rise and then fall, in line with the survey measures of investors stock price expectations A Data Sources Stock price data: our stock price data is for the United States and has been downloaded from 'The Global Financial Database' (http://www.globalfinancialdata.com). The period covered is Q1:1949-Q1:2012. The nominal stock price series is the 'SP 500 Composite Price Index (w/GFD extension)' (Global Fin code '_SPXD'). The daily series has been transformed into quarterly data by taking the index value of the last day of the considered quarter. To obtain real values, nominal variables have been deflated using the 'USA BLS Consumer Price Index' (Global Fin code 'CPUSAM'). The monthly price series has been transformed into a quarterly series by taking the index value of the last month of the considered quarter. Nominal dividends have been computed as follows
where   denotes the 'SP 500 Composite Price Index (w/GFD extension)' described above and   is the 'SP 500 Total Return Index (w/GFD extension)' (Global Fin code '_SPXTRD '). We first computed monthly dividends and then quarterly dividends by adding up the monthly series. Following Campbell (2003) , dividends have been deseasonalized by taking averages of the actual dividend payments over the current and preceding three quarters.
Stock market survey data: The UBS survey is the UBS Index of Investor Optimism, which is available (against a fee) at http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ data_access/data/datasets/ubs_investor.html. The Shiller survey data covers individual investors and has been kindly made available to us by Robert Shiller at Yale University. Since the Shiller data refers to the Dow Jones, we used the PD ratio for the Dow Jones, which is available at http://www.djaverages.com/, to compute correlations. The CFO survey is collected by Duke University and CFO magazine and collects responses from about 450 CFOs.
Inflation expectations data: the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) is available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The Michigan survey is collected by Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan.
B The Wage Income Process
To calibrate  we compute the average dividend-consumption share in the U.S. from 1946-2011, using the 'Net Corporate Dividends' and the 'Personal Consumption Expenditures' series from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This delivers an average ratio of  = 22. Following Campell and Cochrane (1999) we then choose the standard deviation of one-step-ahead consumption growth innovations to be 17 of that of one-step-ahead dividend growth innovations, i.e., s   (ln  +1 − ln   )   (ln  +1 − ln   ) = 1 7  and the correlation between one-step-ahead consumption and dividend growth to be equal to 0.2, i.e.
To achieve this we need to compute the required variance and covariances. We have where  is a constant and (2) a second order approximation error. Using this approximation we have
So that
Using the approximation we also have
Using (37) to substitute the root in the denominator in (38) we get 
So that for the calibrated value of  we indeed get
as claimed. The implied correlation between dividend and price growth is
C Proof of Proposition 1
In equilibrium   = 1 for all  ≥ 0, so that the budget constraint implies   =   +   = (1 +    )   Substituting this into the agents' first order condition delivers the asset pricing equation
Assuming that the transversality constraint
holds, one can iterate forward on (41) to obtain
Standard updating formulas for normal distributions then imply that the posterior mean of ln   using information set   can be derived by updating the posterior mean based on e  −1 according to ln  |  = ln  |   −1 +   = . Using these results, equation (44) can exactly be written as stated by equation (43) in the main text.
F Proof of Proposition 2
The proof relies on the fact that in a situation without uncertainty the expectation of a non-linear function of 'random' variables is identical to the non-linear function of the expectation of these random variables, i.e., for some continuous non-linear function  (· ·) and some random variables  +   + we have under the state assumptions  P   ( +   + ) =  ( P   +   P   + ). Simplifying notation (and slightly abusing it) we let  + =  P   + for all  ≥ 1, so that  + below denotes the subjective expectation conditional on information at time  of the variable  at time  + . The first order conditions (11) can then be written as
for all  ≥ 0. The budget constraint implies
Iterating forward on the latter equation gives
